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This essay addresses the on-going controversy between supporters of minimal government, or 
minarchists, and supporters of no government, or anarchists. Both lay claim to the Libertarian 
principle, which holds that the only justification for the use of force is to deal with aggressive force 
initiated by someone else.  Both agree that force is justified in dealing with aggressors. The only 
question is, who wields it, and how? The essay explains, briefly, the role of private property in all 
this. Private property is really just the operation of the liberty principle in the area of the use of 
things outside ourselves: those who initiate use of such things will have their activities subject to 
continual invasion unless property is recognized, and so property is the natural outcome of liberty, 
taken seriously. But the trouble is, states are monopolies, and maintain themselves at public expense, 
by taxation. This inevitably means interference with private property rights. And so, if we deal with 
aggressors via the state, we turn into partial aggressors ourselves, it seems. The essay points out that 
and why both minarchism and anarchism are virtually impossible in contemporary circumstances, 
but at the level of basic theory, at any rate, the anarchist appears to have the better of it. 
 
 
1. The Question 
 
How much of a state should we have? The libertarian is committed to the general 
answer “very little - at most!” He agrees with Henry David Thoreau: “that government 
is best which governs least.” The question is whether he also agrees with Thoreau’s 
further suggestion - “That government is best which governs not at all!”.(1) On that 
point, libertarians are deeply divided. The purpose of the present essay is to explain 
why both sides in this debate have the appeal they do, and to suggest that the 
theoretical appeal lies with the Anarchist side, while the practical appeal draws 
libertarians to the minarchist side. None of this will be surprising, I would guess, to the 
reader. But a clear explanation of this superior theoretical appeal, as I see it, of 




2. What Libertarians Agree On 
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All libertarians, in the by now fairly well understood contemporary sense of the term, 
espouse the Liberty Principle, which can be variously stated as a principle of rights or, 
as many of us would insist, equivalently as a principle about duties. The statement in 
terms of rights will say some such thing as this: that everyone has a fundamental, 
general right to liberty, limited only by the like right of all others. The other way of 
stating it will be some such as this: We are morally forbidden to initiate force or fraud 
against our fellows.  The two formulations may be argued to be equivalent because a 
right is nothing more than a status such that others have a duty to refrain from 
interfering with one’s doing of the thing to which one has the right. What gives us that 
status is an interesting question, and an important one. However, most libertarians do 
not have a useful answer to that question. (2) “Because we are free”, say, or “born 
free,” or some such is unhelpful, since as a matter of fact many of us are, in any useful 
appraisal of the situation, not free in many of the respects in which libertarians think 
they ought to be so, and yet that fact doesn’t keep us from saying that they ought to 
be. 
What matters is this: the liberty principle is in substance a principle about when it is 
permissible to deprive people of freedom. What is unique about our view is not that we 
think that the fact Jones is trying to murder Smith does give us good reason for 
applying force, as much as needs be, to prevent Jones from doing this - one would 
hope that any sane theory would say that. Rather, it is that we don’t allow any other 
kind of consideration to justify such application than that one person is, or is in the 
way of, planning to, etc., use force or fraud against others - apart from the one kind of 
case where the individual against whom he proposes to use it is himself using it against 
someone else who, in turn, is not doing so to someone still else. Sorry for the prolixity 
of the latter statement, but part of the point of doing so is that to be precise about this 
is no easy matter. 
While it is not easy, there is what libertarians take to be an implication of our view that 
turns out to be of crucial importance for the present inquiry - and a great many other 
inquiries as well. Namely, we take it that what we usually call “robbery” is itself an 
example of the sort of condition we want to disallow, and take to constitute reason to 
justifying counteraction. In other words, we think that Liberty implies Property. And 
since the present subject is hardly even discussable without some such principle, it is 
best to pause, once again, to explain why we think this is so - and this time my 
explanation is far from pleonastic or embarrassingly obvious. 
In most cases where we claim to be the “owners” of something, our claim is grounded 
on a previous transaction, or set of them, with some other persons. I walk to the store, 
select a pair of shoes, hand the man my money or credit card, sign the chit, and I 
emerge with my shoes, and he with what used to be my $100 or whatever. Two points 
distinguish this little story. The first is that the exchange itself is wholly voluntary. The 
man in the shop didn’t have to be in that business; he presumably chose to (OK: 
maybe his wife insisted he get a job, but we hope, at least, that his marriage is 
voluntary!) And second, the legitimacy of this as a justificatory account of why, as of 
now, the shoes are said to be “mine” and the money “his” depends rather importantly 
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on the situation ex ante. The money, prior to the transaction, was mine, the shoes were 
his (that is, the store’s). But how came that to be so? We will point to previous 
voluntary transactions, for several rounds. Eventually, though, we will exit entirely 
from the realm of two-or-n-person transactions and find ourselves - where? The 
erstwhile theoretician now welcomes us to the “state of nature.” In this condition, 
things are different. Something comes to belong to Jones without the help of a previous 
transaction with Smith. And how is this to work? Briefly, we suppose that Jones 
perhaps made something or found it, and that this fact is what made it his. OK: but 
why does it do so? Especially if we got back to a real, honest-to-goodness “state of 
nature” there will, of course, be no published rules, no courts or police - as we might 
say, “no anything” in the way of political organization. 
Some among those who would say this latter will claim that if we are out of the law, we 
are just out of it, and nothing useful can be said. Those who say that cannot be 
libertarians. For libertarians think that if there are courts and laws, we know what they 
should say, and if they don’t say it, we want to throw them in the dustbin and start 
over. In short, we don’t think these arrangements stem from that kind of human 
“institution.” What we do think, though, is this: If indeed someone has literally made 
something, then insofar as that’s how it came to be, it “belongs” to him - the one who 
made it. Or if he found it, then we want to know whether he found it in such a way that 
nobody else had any prior claim on it. Now, some theorists think there is no such case: 
that everybody in the world automatically has a “natural” claim to natural resources at 
large. To make this particular story short, I am going to advise everyone tempted to 
say this to think again. The correct story, in short, is that nobody has any claim on it, in 
the absence of someone’s finding it and undertaking to do something with it - in short, 
to take it into his life and invest, as it were, some of himself in it; and once that person 
does do that, then anyone else coming later who proceeds to help himself to these of 
that item without so much as a by-your-leave would be assaulting the maker or finder. 
In short, he would be violating our liberty principle, for he would be using what 
amounts to force against someone who was trying to continue on in a series of actions 
undertaken by himself, which actions were wholly benign. 
The leftist will insist they are not “wholly benign”, no doubt - but where is his 
argument? He appeals to the “principle” that nature just naturally belongs to everyone, 
but why on earth should anyone think that? Mind you, even John Locke thought with 
the “leftists” on that point. His idea here is religious, and doesn’t offer much help to 
the would-be leftist: God, it seems, gave everything to us all in common, you see! (3) 
Of course there are some questions about this. Like, how did he know that? What if 
God gave it to somebody else – the Hindus, say, or those so-and-so’s, the ____’s! Of 
course Locke would claim that he must have done the right thing and given it to the 
good guys - thus illustrating once again the total uselessness of religious appeals in 
morals. 
Anyway, Locke supposed he had an argument to get around this common-ownership 
problem, one that would nevertheless shore up our claims to the fruits of our own 
efforts. It is not clear how well Locke would have succeeded in this if the starting 
premise had been right.  But after all, it’s not. The obvious way to go is to point out 
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that stuff is just stuff – it isn’t yours or mine or everybody’s, it’s un-owned. Thus, 
nobody at all has any claims on it, unless and until somebody gets in there and does 
something with it, such as turn it into a motel. (4) 
In short, the coast is, so to say, clear in the State of Nature, and thus, the argument 
just given is definitive - if, that is to say, we accept the liberty principle itself as our 
guide. But that is what we are presumptively doing here - though I for one refuse to 
say that it is a “self-evident” principle or that it expresses a “natural right” in any other 
sense than that it is the right rule to use, and is so independently of what any 
government or institution may tell us. (I want to say that we must defend these basic 
principles via the right version of the “social contract” but to spell that out would take 
us much too far afield for present purposes.  I do try to make some headway in several 
other places. (5)  
 If everything has to be voluntary to pass moral muster, and if property rights come 
into it in the way I have sketched, then let us notice that the size of the group of 
persons with whom one does voluntary business is irrelevant, as is the technical side of 
things - how one produces what one sells, and so on. Then the Property Principle, as 
we might call it, being a “theorem” of the Liberty Principle, taking the latter to be a 
sort of “axiom,” is very strong indeed. And if it is, we are then edging up toward 
presenting a huge problem for what is usually known as The State. 
 
 
3. The State 
 
What we mean by ‘the state’ is this: an agency, whose membership is an identifiably 
smallish proper subset of all the people there are in the community or society over 
which this state rules, which has (approximately, as may be) enough political power to 
make rules [“laws”] which apply to all, and which those people may be coerced into 
compliance with. Or in short, as many of us say, the state has a “monopoly of 
coercion” in the society in question. The trouble is, that’s too short, for in any society, 
at any given time, some people will be coercing others without the state’s preventing 
this, or even being able to do so. However, those private coercers do not claim to have 
got into their positions by virtue of holding political power - and if they do, then they 
are agents of the state and we don’t have a counter example. But of course, that raises 
the question, “when is power political power?” Again, a satisfactory discussion of that 
would also take us too far afield. However, there is one proposed answer, or part of an 
answer that we will of course need to reject straight off: that political power is 
legitimate power over others. We, and Thoreau, aren’t going to accept that this agency 
really has genuinely legitimate power. So we’re going to have to say, lamely, that 
somehow it has the ability to use coercion and “get away with it”; that is, the people 
over whom they use it will not complain, or at the least, nobody will stride in and try to 
prevent the agents of the government from coercing the person in question in the way 
in question. The ship of state sails on a sea of passive acquiescence by its people. I 
shall assume that in some such way, we can arrive at a wholly “neutral” analysis of the 
notion of political power and hence of The State. 
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It is easy to see why the libertarian is going to have a problem with The State, on the 
face of it. After all, the state gets its way by compelling people to do what it wants them 
to do, and it takes no back-talk. Under what circumstances could it get away with that, 
if we are right? To this there is a perhaps promising answer: it could “get away with it” 
in our eyes if it used its coercive power only to deal with what we would agree are 
miscreants: murderers, rapists, robbers, defrauders. In short, as Locke proposed, the 
state would be in the business of enforcing the Law of Nature, otherwise known as our 
Liberty Principle.  Or - oops, wait a minute! - more precisely, the state would be an 
agency which was created for the purpose of doing a better job of that than we could do 
on our own. Locke thinks that if we go it alone, there will be inevitable and 
interminable arguments about who owns what, how much so-and-so is to be punished 
for violating the LN in such-and-such a way or how seriously, and so on. He proposes 
to fix all this with a set of uniform laws for all, a judiciary that will impartially settle 
controversies, and a police force/etc. that will apply the law uniformly to all. (6) Or - 
oops, wait a minute! - more precisely, the state would be an agency which was created 
for the purpose of doing a better job of that than we could do on our own. Locke thinks 
that if we go it alone, there will be inevitable and interminable arguments about who 
owns what, how much so-and-so is to be punished for violating the LN in such-and-
such a way or how seriously, and so on. He proposes to fix all this with a set of 
uniform laws for all, a judiciary that will impartially settle controversies, and a police 
force/etc. that will apply the law uniformly to all. 
But there are, as it is surely familiar to all readers, two problems with this. One of 
them is big, and the other one is absolutely crucial, though subtler than the other. The 
Big problem is, of course, the old “who guards the guardians?” issue: How do we 
devise one of these things without it getting out of hand and coming up with all kinds of 
silly laws having no justification at all from the Law of Nature? How can we be so sure 
these institutions will indeed be fair, impartial, etc. - after all, the fact that that’s what 
we wanted when we made the thing hardly assures us that it will be that way in fact 
(and of course no end of history suggests that pessimism of a fairly tall order is called 
for on this point). That’s the big problem. Locke’s own solution, such as it is, is to call 
for democracy (more or less), and that remains the popular solution to this very day 
and, apparently, for some time to come the inevitable wave of the future. As we are 
slowly beginning to appreciate, though, democracy, far from being a real solution to 
these problems, shows every sign of being likely to exacerbate the original condition, 
virtually without limit. (7)  
From this point of view, a potentially anarchist objection to government is: government 
can’t work, in precisely the way it was called in to work. There’s no way around it, and 
we’ll do better without it. The potentially minarchic response is: Well, there’s no real 
alternative, so let’s just get to work and try to fix it so it works at least tolerably well. If 
we put the matter in those terms, it is clear that there is much work to do. The 
anarchist has to show that his idea is even possible - that it even makes sense to suppose 
that we could have civil peace, order, and prosperity without the restraining hand of 
government. The minarchist, on the other hand, has to convince us that there is a real 
prospect of containing government, once it’s let loose on us. 
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We’ll return to those issues, if too briefly, below. But meanwhile, this now brings us to 
the heart of the matter. We can put this “heart of the matter” in two sets of terms, 
though I think they’ll really end up equivalent. One way is to delve back into Locke 
himself and focus on an interesting restriction he proposes: “Thirdly, The Supreme 
Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent.” (8) I 
suppose many readers of Locke are more or less asleep by the time they get to that 
passage, it being on the next-last page or so. But in fact, it’s a wake-up call, clarion 
and fortissimo: for if indeed we take it literally, it is very difficult to see how we could 
have government at all. After all, government as we know it gets its income from taxes. 
Locke and the minarchists after him want government to do something, for sure. But 
neither Locke nor we are unrealistic enough to think that people can be got to do all 
those things - some, after all, rather dangerous! - for nothing. Where is the money to 
come from? And suppose that this or that man objects to paying the bill that the State 
hands him for its fairly extensive (even on a minarchist rendering of it) services? Well, 
according to Locke, he can just say No, and that’s that.  
And worse yet, it certainly looks as though he’s right! After all, our Principle says that 
nobody can impose a net harm, a worsening, of someone else’s situation. The robber 
is wrong because he leaves you worse off, and leaves you no real choice in the matter 
either. The government - well, it too, in our experience, leaves you worse off with no 
real choice in the matter - doesn’t it? And doesn’t it do this even on the best account of 
what it does – that is, the minarchist account? Even if the government doesn’t go 
outlawing the sale of sausages less than 20 cm. long (9) or requiring that we refrain 
from smoking pot, it still looks as though it is going to be taking money from some 
people who don’t want to spend it for that purpose, even if it’s the jolly good purpose 
of apprehending gangsters. 
Just to keep the point from getting sidetracked, here’s an example of the state at work, 
concerning a certain social club in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada) whose laudable 
purpose is to provide a social outlet for ex-alcoholics. So no alcoholic beverages were 
served, but otherwise they drank soft drinks, played billiards, smoked and chatted. 
Trouble is, the state doesn’t allow smoking in most public places: to do this, you have 
to get a liquor permit. And the liquor board says that you can only get a liquor permit 
if you actually serve liquor. So either the club closes or it sells booze, thus defeating 
the entire point.  That’s the state at work, folks; multiply by a zillion or so, and you get 
the point. Keeping the State to the straight and narrow is evidently going to be at least 
very near to impossible, and has never in fact happened. The basic problem is simple: 
give a kid a match, and what can you expect, especially if the people who watch over 
him to keep him in line are - more kids! 
Now, Locke is famous for his theory of “implicit consent.” The idea is - Hey, we get all 
these benefits from the State and so of course we won’t object to paying our share, 
right?! Err … well -- wait a minute - not so fast! Who says we’re getting our money’s 
worth? Not, usually, the taxpayer himself; indeed, he is rarely asked, and he can be 
forgiven for not expecting much attention to be paid to his answer. And what if Locke, 
or his government, puts the question to him - will they stay for an answer? You can just 




4. The Problem Stated in terms of Rights 
 
We need to generalize this, and it is best, I think, to do so by shifting to another 
vocabulary. The right to liberty, which we all have if the libertarian theory is correct, is 
what we have come to call a “negative” right. Such a right imposes on others the duty 
not to do something, the duty to refrain from intervening to prevent the rightholder 
from doing as he would like, thus allowing him to do that. (That indeed is all that 
“allowing”, “permitting”, etc., come to.) 
Now, as the terminology suggests, we can also define another idea of rights: “Positive” 
rights. If a negative right imposes negative duties, duties not to do something, then the 
idea of a positive right, as we would expect, is to impose positive duties, that is, duties 
to do something. You can satisfy a negative right, insofar forth, by pulling up your cot 
and going right to sleep: that way, you murder no one, you cheat no one, you rob no 
one. But if there are positive rights, that’s a different story altogether. Positive rights 
say, “get off your tail, chaps, there’s work to do! Get with it! Save this life! Feed that 
starveling! Help this innocent lady unhand that villain!” Etc. 
It is sometimes supposed that the positive/negative distinction is the same as the 
liberty/welfare distinction. But that is a mistake, even though those who make it usually 
make it in a way that doesn’t look at though it’s going to matter all that much. 
However, it also can matter “all that much” and the present case is the locus classicus 
for such mattering. For consider now the Right to Liberty itself. If it’s negative, then, 
as we would hope, it says to others, “as long as you refrain from molesting, assaulting, 
etc., you’re OK, we won’t bother you!” But what if it’s positive? Then things may be a 
lot different. If Smith over there has a positive right to liberty, then suppose that he’s 
in real trouble - that horrible person Jones is enslaving him. Now what do the rest of us 
do? Well, if we mean it about positive rights, then it seems we have to go and help free 
Smith. We must - that is, we may be compelled to help, coerced into helping, should we 
be inclined to put up a snit about it. And so this fussy little question of whether the 
basic right to liberty is negative or positive turns out to be not so fussy and little after 
all.  
It is also, I take it, obvious, when you think of it, which version is basically right - 
namely, the negative version. The Principle of Liberty says that the only reason 
justifying compulsion over you or me or anybody is to prevent our coercing somebody 
else, or perhaps to punish us for some previous coercion we are guilty of. Well, our 
Ordinary Law-Abiding Citizen, we will suppose, is guilty of no such thing. So how, 
now, can the State come along and say, “Pay up, or else!” ? Clearly, it can’t. Anything 
along that line violates his liberty right. The internal content of the liberty principle 
rules out interpreting it as implying basic positive rights. (Non-basic positive rights are 
another matter. By our own agreements, we often bind ourselves to do this or that 
positive act. Most of economic life would be impossible were it not so. But the point is 
that these bindings are self-imposed. And our question is whether any such thing can 
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be imposed by others at large. That is what, it appears, we must answer in the 
negative.) 
Maybe you think that person A is guilty of some crime and that A deserves to be 
apprehended and punished, and maybe you’re willing to join a posse and help round 
him up, or to pay something to somebody else for doing so. Yes - but then again, 
maybe you’re not. And if you aren’t, then what? The answer appears to be: it’s game 
over for the State. It appears that on Locke’s own principles, there simply is no way to 
have a state, however Lockean. 
Now, the Minarchist, in principle, would appear to have no choice but to admit taxes 
for the sole purpose of defending liberty as a justifiable incursion on people’s rightful 
liberty. But putting it that way should make him uncomfortable. Let’s pause a moment 
to appreciate just how uncomfortable he should be. How much of this sort of incursion 
is allowed? And how extensive should be the set of persons whom our non-volunteer 
must be expected to help with this de-tyrannization program? Of course, once we have 
a state set up, the answer presumably will be: all the other folks inside that circle, your 
fellow citizens. Oh? Well, but wait a minute! Plenty of people outside that circle are 
also, we may imagine, in big trouble and could use some liberating. Why does the 
buck, as it were, stop at the borders of this state? For after all, the state is artificial; its 
boundaries are determined, we must suppose, by whatever political principles led to its 
existence - and in our case, remember, it was supposed to be the Libertarian 
Principle. But that principle says that everybody is entitled to general liberty, not just 
the particular n thousands or millions who happen to be there (pointing at the map of 
Lichtenstein or Canada, say). Well, you see the difficulty. When we turn 
contemptuously to those absurd Leftists of whom we like to make fun, one of the things 
we say to them is: so why aren’t you contributing 95% of your income to help the poor 
in Bangladesh (etc.)? Now, liberating people from political oppression may seem, as it 
were, “easier” than feeding them, but if we bear in mind, as our sample case, the cost 
of the current (as I write) war in Iraq to the Americans, it will perhaps not be so 
obvious that promoting general liberty around the world is going to be the least bit 
cheaper than feeding the billions.  You get the idea. 
We would want, ideally, a principled answer to this question, and what we’ve got is 
pretty lame. Or at least, it is unless the defender of the State, however minimal, can 
come up with some nice elegant way of picking out just the set of people such that we 
have to be ready to help them become free, but are off the hook regarding all the rest. 
Note, by the way, that we are never “off the hook” so far as negative liberty is 
concerned. But there you see the advantage of the Liberty idea: we can live up to the 
requirements of (negatively construed) liberty without lifting a finger – a pretty 
comfortable “hook,” really. No such thing, though, with positive liberty - until such 
time as we live in a perfectly libertarian world, right? Uh, uh .... 
 
 
5. Can we justify the State? 
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So we turn, briefly, to this interesting question, which really amounts to a request for 
justifying the State. And once you start in on this, you’ll find, if you do your homework 
carefully, that, as the boys say, it ain’t easy! Remember, we are now persuaded that 
“negative” liberty is where it’s at. Now, negative liberty, to be sure, allows you to 
impose obligations on yourself if you want. It allows you, in particular, to take on 
duties and obligations in the course of voluntary arrangements with others - the duties 
are part of the arrangements, in a lot of cases. So one thought is to buy into the 
Lockean Social Contract, as it were, and hold hands with a certain set of thirty million 
or so people and agree with all and only those people that we will jolly will help protect 
their rights, provided they agree to protect ours, too. Even if we do this, let it be 
pointed out, it is not obvious that we as yet have a state. And anyway, suppose that 
seventy-three people excuse themselves from this little ceremony - as is their right, 
remember? Now what? Well, on the face of it, you can’t touch those folks (that is to 
say, you can’t touch them for the taxes which you’re all agreeing to impose on each 
other). Which precisely means, though, that those are not taxes as we understand the 
term. What to do? 
We can take the view that those folks are being unreasonable, and we’ll just march 
over and “explain” to them - in the spirit of the traffic cop “explaining” why you are 
about to get the ticket - that, you see, you are, as you evidently failed to realize, getting 
a good deal here and so you’ve jolly well got to help pay up... Better, though, would be 
to just stuff it and just take their money and be off - as is familiar to all of us taxpayers, 
right? But – gosh! - I think I just lost sight of Libertarianism, you know? 
So now what? I can think of two and only two suggestions. One is to lay down a really 
reasonable criterion for when we may do what looks a lot like imposing on somebody 
but maybe isn’t really, after all, in the end. And the other is to bite the bullet and 
admit that the state just isn’t legitimate, but considering how they come about, well, 
OK ...  
So, let’s look at each. 
 
 
6. The State as a Good Deal 
 
Since Hobbes those of us in the know on these matters will be aware that there is 
basically just one way of justifying the State.  
How, you may ask, is the state justified? Well, the same way that anything is justified: 
by demonstrating that it is, from the point of view of the persons involved, better than 
alternatives. In the case of the State, the persons involved are, of course, everyone in its 
borders. It doesn’t really matter much what those borders are for this purpose, though. 
If you could really establish that an institution for a State of respectable size would 
have the property in question, it would be hard to quibble with the claim that that 
institution was justified. Right.  But … can we do this? 
In rather abstractly general terms, let us say that S (the institution we’re talking about) 
is justified if and only if S is better for all concerned. The state is coercive and affects 
 10 
non-consenting parties, so what we’re asking in the case of the state is for a 
demonstration that, by gum, even taking into account its coercive properties the state is a 
good deal from all points of view. Now, is this crazy, or what? Well, not quite. For we 
can perhaps imagine that we have some sort of a problem such that the only way to get 
us all to act the way we need to act to solve it is to be coercive about it. Yet each 
person might find that acceptable, perhaps. Let’s see how. 
The idea so far can be put in terms of Public Goods theory. A Public Good, in the 
economist’s technical sense, is one whose benefits “can’t” be confined to those who 
produce it, that is, who pay the costs. There’s spillover: some people get the good who 
didn’t pay, some pay who don’t get the goods. Problem! Now suppose that these are, 
not goods, but bads - only public bads. So the people who benefit from them don’t pay 
(much of) the cost of production. Example: robbers, who cart off the money without 
paying for it, e.g. by working for it. Instead, they free-ride on their victims. What’s 
worse, it isn’t just that those victims don’t come out of it as well as they might, it’s that 
they come out of it worse off, period. Very bad. Now, suppose that the citizen can deal 
effectively with such people by being compelled to help pay the police (or whatever): if 
the cost, even though involuntary (indeed, including the costs of its being involuntary), 
is less than the benefit, we’re off and running. 
Or at least, that’s what Hobbes and all the other statists think. But they’ve failed to 
raise a rather important question: mightn’t there be further options besides just the two 
– (a) involuntary payments to the state, and (b) being robbed? Answer: of course! The 
State cops are by no means the only way to protect yourself and your property. (In 
fact, it’s becoming fairly well known that they actually aren’t nearly as good, by any 
means, as privately hired police whose specific duty is precisely to protect you and 
your property. (10)  So what the argument really has to prove is that no 
nongovernmental agency can equal the state on a cost-benefit analysis. Now, that is 
indeed a tall order. So tall, indeed, that I think it fair to say that the present consensus 
is that - contrary to the blithe pronouncements of those who first started talking this 
way (such as the economist Paul Samuelson) - it’s actually hopeless. Forget trying to 
“justify” the State, then. (11)  
 
 
6. Or as the Inevitable Outcome of Anarchy 
 
Some probably want to see a word or two here about Nozick’s rather intricate 
argument, that initial anarchy would lead to a minimal (or “ultra-minimal”) state. (12) 
The argument is intricate, indeed, and almost defies summary. We start with anarchy. 
Various protective agencies spring up. But size is a natural advantage, in this peculiar 
biz - you’re going to feel safer with a bigger firm, right? And in the end one firm will 
have a monopoly. For reasons that remain obscure, this firm will feel obliged to protect 
everybody while it’s at it, and perhaps to compensate those who’d rather not but had 
no choice.  One big trouble is that the premise is highly questionable. Apple 
Computers still exists alongside mighty Microsoft, and it is not at all obvious that little 
 11 
protection agencies won’t flourish alongside big ones. In fact, come to think of it, they 
do right now. Modern nations are awash with little protection agencies working 
alongside the almighty state. Nozick’s argument is, as one would expect from that 
writer, ingenious and induces head-scratching, but it doesn’t produce much conviction.  
As an exercise in armchair social speculation, it’s cool; as an argument for something 
we’re interested in, though, it doesn’t really make it. 
 
 
7. The State as a Gang you Can’t Get Rid Of 
 
There’s quite a different way to look at the state, however, and on the face of it, a lot 
more plausible. On this view, we don’t imagine that the state is “justified” - hah! But 
we ask instead, is there any way to avoid it? It isn’t that the state is necessary for 
producing some good thing we’d all like to have - it isn’t. It’s that the social situation is 
such that there’s always a sort of power vacuum that powerful and ambitious people 
will jump into, and there’s just no practical way to prevent that. Therefore, what we 
should do is accept the state, but try to minimize the damage. Perhaps minarchy would 
be a sort of lower limit of such an effort. (13)  
How we will do this is a nice question, when you think of it. The State is a monopoly, 
with all the benefits that brings to the governors - at the expense, of course, of the 
governed. Now, as Plato’s character Thrasymachus assures us, the King, or for that 
matter the Members of Parliament - indeed, for that matter the lowliest Civil Servant - 
are basically in this thing to rob us as effectively as they can. But don’t despair, folks! 
It has been noted that once a country goes to the dogs, there isn’t much left for the 
king. Better, on reflection, to let the people make some money, and then - ta-dah! - 
you can skim a hefty bit off the top and if you’ve skimmed cleverly, you’ll end up with 
a bigger income than if you tried to take it all! So we don’t come out of it quite as 
badly as it may sound. (Well, yes - there are people like Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, 
Stalin, etc... but the ones in the know are appreciating the superior long-term payoffs 
of good ol’ take-em-for-all-you-can democracy, and that does leave us something. 
Indeed, democracy’s innumerable friends seem to be deluded into thinking that we are 
actually wealthier because of our democracy. And, hey! What more can you ask than 
that your victim positively loves you for robbing him? I ask you, now!) 
A further word on democracy might be relevant at this point. What’s relevant about it 
is that democracy seems to be the Inevitable Wave of the Future. Gosh, who doesn’t 
want a vote? So who wouldn’t agree that we should all have the right to vote? 
Democracy sells - that’s what it does. And this enables the minarchists’ problem along 
this line to be put in a nutshell: try selling Libertarianism to the mob - to hoi polloi. 
See where that gets you! Democracy, remember, consists in putting the foxes in charge 
of the henhouse, where the henhouse is all of us and the foxes are a small majority of 
us. It won’t have escaped the foxes’ attention how easy it is to elect somebody who will 
set up an unnecessary Widget plant over in this area, or give “aid” to the poor so-and-
sos over there, and so on until your tax bill is about 55% of your income. With 
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incentives like that going for the governors, the prospect of minimizing government 
looks about equivalent to having a nice sunny seaside vacation in Antarctica. It isn’t 
going to happen! 
 
 
8. The Minarchist’s Ultimate Problem 
 
The trouble, then, is that the smell of political power is irresistible to too many of the 
wrong people. If we’re up against people like that - and we are, after all - then 
minimizing the state is basically a pipe dream. Or so it seems; and if it’s true, then 
libertarians will just have to become thoroughly accustomed to doing what they do 
already - and pretty well, too - which is to sit around in coffee houses and bitch at the 
state. But as to actually getting rid of the sucker? - Forget it! 
But if you do look at it that way, then we’re back to the anarchists having the better of 
it. If neither of us has the remotest prayer of a chance of even seriously reducing the 
state, let alone eliminating it, then the question reverts to the abstract one of which 
better instantiates Liberty. And the answer to that, I believe, is that the anarchist 
arrangement does. 
In short: the idea of minarchism is that the ideally good government would literally 
“govern least” in the sense that all and only the bad guys would be apprehended and 
dealt with in the right way, and the state wouldn’t dream about stepping over that 
boundary. But it turns out that any institution that could both do that and do it without 
violating anybody’s rights isn’t the state anyway - it’s a large or (more likely) a large set 
of small private protective agencies and insurance companies. So Thoreau is right: that 
government is best - indeed, the only government that is fully acceptable on libertarian 





(1)  These are the opening sentences in his famous essay “Civil Disobedience.” There 
are innumerable reprintings of the essay; this one happens to be found in Selected 
Writings of Henry Thoreau, ed. by Lewis Leary, (New York: Crofts Classics - Appleton-
Century-Crofts,  1958) p. 9. 
(2)  See, for example, Murray Rothbard’s justly famous For a New Liberty, which 
begins by citing the foundations of libertarianism as the “nonaggression axiom.” The 
axiom in question really just is the libertarian principle, and if it is asked why we 
should accept this as an “axiom” Rothbard appears to have no answer. Robert 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, another classic source for libertarians, is similarly 
bereft of such discussion. The exception here is my own The Libertarian Idea  
[Peterboroush, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2001 - earlier published by 
Temple University Press, 1988)] in which I propose game-theoretic foundations. 
Attempting that is a difficult matter. 
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(3)  John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, sect. 34: God gave the World to 
Men in Common..”. 
(4)  The author has investigated that claim pretty thoroughly in “Property Rights: 
Original Acquisition and Lockean Provisos” in Public Affairs Quarterly vol. 13 #3, July 
1999, pp. 205-227. Also as Ch. 8 in my book, Respecting Persons in Theory and 
Practice (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). 
(5)  See Narveson, The Libertarian Idea. See also “Contracting for Liberty,” in Tibor 
Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds., Liberty for the 21st Century (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). A relevant further article is “The Anarchist’s Case,” in 
Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice  (Lanham, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2002), Ch.apter 11. (Originally in John T. Sanders and Jan Narveson, eds., 
For and Against the State (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). 
(6)  Locke, 2nd Treatise on Civil Government, sections 3, 6, 21, 87-89, 95-99, 123-
131. 135-138. Some have doubted that Locke’s law is precisely what I have proposed 
as general formulations of the Liberty Principle. I think they are wrong, but this is no 
place to discuss the matter. 
(7)  See the unforgettable chapter, “Demokteusis” in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), especially pp. 280-292.  See also a minor 
contribution of my own: “Fixing Democracy”  - Chapter 10 in Respecting persons  (op. 
cit). 
(8)  Locke, Second Treatise,#138. 
(9)  This wonderful example is, I am told, from the E.U. 
(10)  Everyone needs to be acquainted with the remarkable works of Bruce Benson on 
this matter. One is The Entrprise of Law (Pacific Research, 1990). The other is To 
Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice, (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998). 
(11)  To supplement this brief account, I recommend Leslie Green, The Authority of 
the State  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), which argues that “the modern state claims an 
authority that cannot in general be justified” (p. vii) No one to my knowledge has 
dissected the standard arguments more meticulously; he finds them all wanting. 
(12)  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia  (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 
Chapter 2. 
(13)  The remarkable and brilliant work by Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel 
(New York: Norton, 1997) offers very broad-gauged explanations for the fact that it 
was Europeans, rather than someone else, who brought what we think of as the 
modern world into being. Many complex things enter into the overall explanation, but 
what distinguishes those explanations is their remarkable commonsensicality, given the 
facts unearthed. Among the explanatory factors is the rise of the state. This enables a 
large mass of people to act as one, to get things done not otherwise possible (good 
things and bad ones, one must hasten to add!) In the chapter “From Egalitarianism to 
Kleptocracy” Diamond outlines the ascent of social organization from mere bands of 
large-family size, through tribes, chiefdoms with perhaps as many as several thousand, 
to states with their populations in the millions. Even at the third stage, chiefdoms, we 
have “the dilemma fundamental to all centrally governed, nonegalitarian societies. At 
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best, they do good by providing expensive services impossible to contract for on an 
individual basis. At worst, they function unabashedly as kleptocracies, transferring net 
wealth from commoners to upper classes. These noble and selfish functions are 
inextricably linked, although some governments emphasize much more of one function 
than of the other...” (p. 276). Big government especially involves much more scope for 
kleptocracy to flourish. The question is, how do they get people to put up with it? 
Diamond offers four answers. You can disarm the populace and arm the elite; you can 
appeal to the masses by redistributing some of the tribute in popular ways (bread and 
circuses, say); you can maintain public order and curb violence, this being hugely 
useful to all; or, finally, you can “construct an ideology or religion justifying 
kleptocracy”, i.e. [as I am tempted to say], tell enough and the right kind of lies.  
Actual governments tend to use some of each, in a greatly variable mix.   Another fine 
article forcefully advancing the line that government is basically a gang of thieves 
which we are quite unlikely to be able to do anything about is by Randy Holcombe: 
“Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable,” forthcoming (in 2004), in The Independent 
Review. 
 
 
 
 
